Eliminate the Antitrust Exception to Corporate Charging Guidelines 

by Jeffery M. Cross, Todays General Counsel, June/July 2014
Jeffery Cross notes that good corporate governance requires a robust and effective legal compliance program.  Despite this, the Department of Justice prosecutes antitrust violations without weighing the effectiveness of a company’s existing compliance program. Rather, the DoJ utilizes a corporate leniency program where a company that reports a cartel can receive immunity from charges.  Rather than damaging this program, the government should do away with the antitrust exception in order to strengthen compliance programs, while still maintaining the effectiveness of the leniency program.


Antitrust Compliance And Credit For An Effective Compliance Program

by Michael Volkov, JDSupra Law News, 9/25/2013
Michael Volkov discusses the current state of the Antitrust Compliance world. Michael explains the current position taken by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the ramifications of such a position, and its alternatives. Further, both options are discussed with an unbiased eye and effectively present the major problems in the Antitrust Compliance world today.


The FTC and Antitrust Compliance Programs

by Joe Murphy, Compliance & Ethics Professional, July/August 2012
The author summarizes current policy of US DOJ and FTC on antitrust compliance programs.


Antitrust Compliance Programs: SCCE’s Survey Says They Are Less Than They Should Be

in ReputationalCompliance, 6/21/2012
This article comments on Joe’s survey with the SCCE entitled “Antitrust: A Dangerous but Underappreciated Compliance Issue.”  The article continues to explore the issues the survey discussed and offers its own take on the findings.


Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement

by D. Daniel Sokol, in Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 78, 6/6/2012
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy currently used by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. This article employs both quantitative and qualitative survey evidence of cartel practitioners to shed light upon the realities of US cartel enforcement policy. The empirical evidence provided by the practitioner surveys challenges the traditional assumptions behind the success of the DOJ’s cartel program. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that firms regularly game the leniency program to punish their competitors. Finally, the surveys suggest certain structural limitations in organizational behavior within firms that have prevented antitrust compliance programs from becoming embedded in a way that would reduce cartel activity. The conclusion summarizes the article’s findings and outlines potential future steps in cartel research.


The EU Takes a Tentative First Step Toward Compliance Programs

by Joe Murphy, Ethikos, January/February 2012
In this article, the author notes that the European Commission has at least done more than the US Antitrust Division in offering a guidance document on compliance programs, but notes that the Commission fails to back this up with any meaningful recognition of such programs. There is much more that the EC can and should do, if it wants to be serious in promoting compliance programs. As Joe notes, “Getting companies to join the fight against cartels is too important to accept mere rhetoric, totally unsupported by meaningful action.”


Corporations Want Incentives From DOJ’s Antitrust Division

in Bloomberg BNA, 7/16/2012
This article reports on the SCCE survey on antitrust compliance.  The article quotes Roy Snell, head of SCCE as saying: “The rest of Justice supports and recognizes organizations who implement compliance programs and does not take the remarkably strange position the Antitrust Division has.” The article also notes that the Antitrust Division’s policy may provide a disincentive for corporations to have strong compliance programs.
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Detection and Compliance in Cartel Policy

by D. Daniel Sokol, in CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 2, Sept. 2011
In the past few years, companies around the world have spent an increasing amount of resources addressing issues broadly classified as compliance. During this same period, there have been significant theoretical and empirical contributions as to the effects on a firm’s performance of various corporate governance measures designed to reduce criminal behavior on the part of firms and individual managers. If we take these critiques of leniency and cartel detection seriously (especially relative to detection of other types of corporate crimes) antitrust needs to come up with additional ways to promote cartel detection. This article focuses on some suggestions to improve detection and compliance for antitrust with regard to cartels.



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