by Joe Murphy, 2/20/2013
Joe Murphy offers an analysis on the state of modern antitrust compliance programs. He notes a number of elements that should be required of these programs and highlights the essential foundation of a strong, effective program. The paper continues and notes several deficiencies that are seen too often in companies, and discusses how compliance programs tend to elicit a resistance from a significant sector. Joe invites commenters to discuss the issues raised in this paper. If you wish to offer an insight, please comment on our blog post.
Over the past 20 years, courts and competition authorities have imposed fines and, in some jurisdictions, imprisonment with sharply increasing severity, yet there does not seem to be solid evidence that anti-competitive conduct – particularly cartel conduct – is declining in response. Then again, it is impossible to observe the number of undetected cartels, so it is possible that deterrence has increased. The delegates identified and assessed numerous factors that influence compliance, such as competition advocacy, financial penalties, imprisonment, leniency programmes and the establishment of a culture of competition. There was general agreement that authentic corporate competition compliance programmes can be helpful, but substantial variation among the delegates on whether and how such programmes should be rewarded.
by Joe Murphy & William Kolasky, in Antitrust, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2012
This article describes what is needed for an effective anti-cartel compliance program and what competition authorities can do to encourage strong antitrust compliance programs that can help prevent cartel behavior.
The International Law of Antitrust Compliance
by Ted Banks & Joe Murphy, 40 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 368, 2012
This paper looks at the development of antitrust compliance programs, and calls for a change in the negative policies of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the European Commission, which undercut the development of more effective company programs. The paper concludes: “If the governments of the world expect to treat competition law as a basic tenet of international law, governing, as it does, the conduct of local and multinational corporations, then they must also recognize the need to accord competition law compliance programs their proper role in determining enforcement priorities and penalties.”
by Joe Murphy & Donna Boehme, hosted on SSRN, on 11/28/2011
How does society prevent cartels? There has been a tendency to rely solely on enforcement and leniency programs, but has this been at the expense of compliance programs? This paper shows how such programs, when done effectively, can work within companies to prevent and detect cartels. However, the current approach of the EU and the US Antitrust Division severely undercut program effectiveness. Dr. Stephan’s previous article suggested compliance programs do not work against cartels, but there are factors that indicate that such programs can do much more, if government changes its antagonistic approach to such programs.
by Joe Murphy, 10/7/2011
Joe Murphy was retained by the OECD Competition Committee to create a white paper for use in the multinational meeting held in Paris on June 29, 2011. The paper examines the role compliance programs could play in the global fight against cartels, and lays out a route for governments to achieve this objective.
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